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Abstract. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
has been widely used in traditional power systems for operation and con-
trol. As increasingly more ICT technologies are deployed to improve the
smartness of the power grid, cyber security is becoming an important
issue in the development of smart grids, for example, false data injection
attack (FDIA) poses a serious threat. The paper analyzes the impact of
false data injection attack on smart grid state estimation under random
packet losses. First, a measurement model of power grids under random
packet loss is established, and an attack vector range that can fool the at-
tack detector is acquired. Then, a mean square error matrix of weighted
least squares estimation is proposed, taking into account potential false
data injection attacks. A IEEE-14 nodes system is used to evaluate the
performance of the weighted least squares state estimation under three
different scenarios, namely false data injection attack only, random pack-
et loss only, and under both random packet loss and false data injection
attack.
Keywords: False data injection attack · Random packet losses ·Weight-
ed least squares estimation · Smart grid
1 Introduction
Modern power systems transmit electricity from generators to users via large-
scale transmission and distribution networks. To ensure safe and reliable opera-
tion of the system, increasingly more ICT technologies are introduced into the
power systems to improve the smartness [1]. However, the introduction of mod-
ern communication networks not only facilitates information interaction and
wide-area system monitoring, protection and control of power grids but also
makes it vulnerable to network invasion [2] [3]. In recent years, cyber-attacks on
power grids around the world have been viewed as a principal threat, not just a
conceptual one.
For example, Iran’s Blushehr nuclear power plant was attacked by the S-
tuxnet virus in 2010, which caused the delay of power generation and seriously
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damaged Iran’s industrial facilities [4]. The transmission lines in Ukraine were
continuously tripped in 2015, while the information system was implanted with
malicious software, which blocked the system restart [5]. In 2019, several cities
in Venezuela including its capital city Caracas plunged into darkness, and power
outages affected 21 of the country’s 23 states. According to the media reports,
the direct cause of the power failure was a cyber-attack on the country’s largest
hydropower station. Soon after, several transformer explosions occurred in the
federal district of Caracas, causing another power failure [6].
The power system control center collects measurement data from differen-
t power devices and components through the supervisory control and provide
instructions back to the system [7]. State estimation is a key functionality in
real-time power system monitoring and supervisory control. By analyzing the
data collected by the SCADA systems, the current operating state of the power
grids can be estimated while bad data and anomalies in the collected measure-
ments can be eliminated.
However, state estimation can be vulnerable to cyber-attack in the open net-
work environment. The false data injection attack (FDIA) against the state esti-
mator in the SCADA system was investigated by Liu et al in 2009 [8], and it was
found that existing bad data detection methods relying on Chi-square detector
may not work in response to some false data injection attacks. An experienced
attacker can deliberately design the attack vector such that these attacks can
bypass the Chi-square detector. Once the sensor is successfully hacked, the tam-
pered measurement will spread in the network, resulting in system performance
degradation or even instability [9].
In the research area of false data injection attack, some researchers aim to
identify the vulnerability of the system and build the attack models[10] [11] [12]
[13], and this helps to improve the understanding of the attack mechanism in
order to design a better defense system. For example, a linear spoofing attack
strategy and the corresponding feasibility constraints are demonstrated where
fake data can be effectively designed to cause system failure [10]. In [11], the
potential impact of unobservable attacks is investigated, and the least measur-
able attack strategy is proposed. Under the fully measurable model and partially
measurable model, the existence conditions of unobservable subspace attacks are
derived, based on which two attack strategies are proposed in [12]. The first s-
trategy directly affects the system state by hiding attack vectors in the system
subspace, and the second strategy misleads the bad data detection mechanism.
Meanwhile, other researchers focus on the detection and defense of the system
in the presence of attacks [14][15][16][17][18][19]. For example, both active detec-
tion and estimation-based detection are proposed in [14]. In the active detection
method, a reasonable excitation signal is designed to be superimposed on the
control signals, which improves the detectability of attacks on the actuator at-
tack. The other method estimates the value of the attack by using the unknown
input observer. In [15], a FDIA attack detection mechanism based on the incre-
ments of analytic measurements in the micro-grid environment was proposed.
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Most existing researches are based on the analysis of the acquired measure-
ments, but the impact of data communication is not considered. The FDIA in
smart grid applications is an attack that reduces the integrity of data acquired by
the system. In the existing communication technology, data transmitted through
the network is often in the form of packets[20]. Most existing approaches con-
struct the attack model and detect the attack using acquired measurements and
the estimation of measurements [10]-[18]. However, in addition to potential F-
DIA, the data transmitted through the network may also be affected by network
characteristics such as data losses during the transmission phase. This paper in-
vestigates the data injection attack on power system state estimation considering
data losses in communication. The main contributions are as follows:
– A DC (direct current) model of the system under data injection attack is
deduced, taking into account the random packet losses.
– The mechanism of weighted least squares state estimation and bad data
detection are analyzed and an undetected range of attack vectors is derived.
– Based on the established DC measurement model, the mean square error
matrix of state estimation under the FDIA is analyzed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The transmission model of
sensor measurements in the power grids under random packet loss is discussed in
Section 2. Section 3 analyses the effects of random packet loss and data injection
attacks on weighted least squares estimation, and the range of attack vectors is
also studied. Simulation results are presented in Section 4, and the weighted
least squares state estimation results under three different cases are compared.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Data Transmission Model
The SCADA system in the power grids collects sampled measurements from
sensors through the communication network However, due to limitations of the
communication technology, data may get lost during the transmission. Figure
1 illustrates the whole process from data sampling and transmission to state
estimation.
As shown in Figure 1, at time instant tk−1, the measurement device samples
and transmit the sensor measurements to the network in the form of packets. Due
to network induced delays, after the transmission delay dk−1, the SCADA system
will receive the sampled measurements at time instant tk−1+dk−1. Further, some
data may be lost during the transmission process, such as the data at time instant
tk shown in Figure 1. Once the SCADA system obtains the measurements, the
estimator can receives the data after the computing time delay of ck−1. Power
grids are typical complex cyber-physical systems with numerous sensors, and all
sensor data will go through the similar process as shown in Figure 1 when they
are transmitted to the SCADA system.
Define the measurements received by the SCADA system at sampling instant
k as zk, zk ∈ R
m , and if there exists data packet losses, two popular compensated
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Fig. 1. The data sampling, transmission and state estimation process.
methods are often adopted. One is to directly replace the lost data with 0 [21].
Another is to replace the lost data with the previous sampled data. This paper
adopts the first method, i.e., the loss packet is set as 0. For random packet losses,
the received measurements can be expressed by
zlk = λkzk, (1)
where λk ∈ R
m×m is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are either 1 or
0. When a measurement is lost, its corresponding value is set to 0.
2.2 Power Grid Measurement Model
When the system is subject to a false data injection attack, the measurement
process of the grids is shown in Figure 2. When a sensor device samples mea-
surements, it may be invaded by an attacker by deception, and false data are
injected. Next, the sensor transmits the corrupted data to the SCADA over the
network. When random packet loss is not considered at the sampling instant k,
the AC measurement model can be described as
zk = h(xk) + vk, (2)
where zk is denoted as the measurement vector, xk is the system state vector,
vk is the Gaussian measurement noise, and h(xk) is the functional dependency
between measurements and state variables.
If the ground admittance and branch conductance are ignored and assume
that the voltage phase difference between two nodes is negligible, the voltage
amplitude of the nodes is close to unit quantity 1. The DC measurement model
can be used to approximate AC measurement model. The DC measurement
model can be expressed as
zk = Hxk + vk, (3)
where H is the steady-state functional dependency between measurements and
state variables.
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Fig. 2. The power grid measurement process subject to false data injection attack.
When only random packet loss is considered, at the sampling instant k, the
DC measurement model can be expressed as
zlk = λk(Hxk + vk). (4)
When only a data injection attack is considered and assume that the injected
value is akand ak ∈ R
m. If ak is nonzero, the corresponding measurement is
tampered. Then the measurement contains the attack vector ak, which can be
expressed as
zak = zk + ak, (5)
where ak is the attack vector injected to measurement.
When random packet loss is considered, the measurement function can be
expressed as
zlak = λkzak. (6)
Eqn (6) is the measurement model under the false data injection attack which
considers both the influence of random packet loss and data injection attack on
the measurements of the grid.
3 Analysis of Weighted Least Squares Estimation
State estimation is used for monitoring the operating state of the grid and to
remove bad data, and the weighted least square method is a popular state es-
timation method. The false data injection attack aims to mislead the state es-
timation, and it is necessary to have a detailed analysis of the state estimator.
According to the weighted least squares estimation, the objective function can
be expressed as
min J (xk) = (zk −Hxk)
T
W (zk −Hxk), (7)
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Define ẑk = Hx̂k as the state estimation of the system, and the residual between
the real and the measurement estimation is defined as rk, and rk can be expressed
as
rk = zk − ẑk. (9)
According to the Chi-square detector, 2-norm of the residual must be less
than the threshold to consider that there is no bad data, i.e.,
‖rk‖2 ≤ τ, (10)
where τ is the threshold of the Chi-square detector, which can be obtained
by checking the Chi-square distribution table. When there is only a false data
injection attack, the injected increment must meet certain conditions in order






where x̂ak the corrupted estimation due to FDIA. The estimate of the measure-
ment is ẑak = Hx̂ak, and the residuals can be expressed as









HTW )(zk + ak).
(12)
To evade the detector, Eqn (13) must be satisfied, that is
‖rak‖2 ≤ τ. (13)




HTW ), Eq. (13) can be re-written as
‖B(zk + ak)‖2 ≤ τ. (14)
According to the compatibility
‖B(zk + ak)‖2 ≤ ‖B‖2‖(zk + ak)‖2, (15)
when ‖B‖
2
‖(zk + ak)‖2 ≤ τ hold, the Eq. (14) will be hold, where ‖B‖2 =
√
ηmax(BTB) is the induced norm and ηmax(B
TB) is the maximum eigenvalue
of the matrix BTB.
Therefore,





Remark 1. Inequality (16) represents a subset of the attack vector which will
not trigger an alarm from the bad data detector.
Corollary 1. Eqn (17) is the non-detectable spoofing range of the attack vector.






According to the triangle inequality, it’s easy to prove Corollary 1 is true. The
specific derivation is given as follows.
According to the triangle inequality of vector 2- norm,





hold, the Eqn (16) will be hold. So Eqn (17) is a safe
range of the attack vector.
When packets are randomly lost, the integrity of the collected data by SCA-
DA is destroyed. However, due to the redundancy of data in data acquisition
of the power grids, the effect of the loss of a small number of measurements
may small. To study the effect of data injection attack on the performance of
state estimation under random packet losses, the mean square error (MSE) of
weighted least squares state estimation under random packet losses is derived.
Suppose that the state vector xk, the attack vector ak, and the noise vk obey
the Gaussian distribution where the mean value is µxk = 0, and the variance
is Rxk , Rak , Rv. When there is random packet loss, the measurement model of
the system is shown by Eqn (6). Combined Eqn (11) with Eqn (6), the state







W (zk + ak)
= (HTλkWH)
−1
HTλkW (zk + ak).
(19)
When the system state estimation residual is defined as εxk = x̂lak − xk, εxk




HTλkW (zk + ak)− xk
= (HTλkWH)
−1
HTλkW (Hxk + vk + ak)− xk
= (HTλkWH)
−1
HTλkW (vk + ak)
(20)
When there is random packet losses and data injection attack, the mean square













Let Bk = (H





Ideally, when there is no packet losses and data injection attacks, λk = I, ak = 0.






Comparing Eqn (22) and (23), it can be found that the existence of random
packet losses will not only affect the state estimation, but also affect the effect
of data injection attack.
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4 Simulation Study
To assess the impact of data injection attack under random packet losses on
smart grid state estimation, IEEE-14 node system is used in the simulation
experiments, as shown in Figure 3. IEEE-14 node system has 54 measurements,
where 1-14 are the measurements of the active power of the bus, 15-34 are
the measurements of branch power of the incoming node, and 35-54 are the
measurements of branch power of the outgoing node. Assuming that the noise
of each measurement obeys the Gaussian distribution, i.e., vi˜N(0, 0.02
2), where
i = 1, 2, · · · , 54. Considering the phase angle of the reference bus δ1 = 0, it is only
necessary to estimate the state quantity of the other 13 nodes, and H ∈ R54×13.
1





Fig. 3. The power grids measurement process.
Firstly, node 1 is selected as the reference node, and the state truth value
and the measurement truth value are obtained by 100 power flow calculations.
It is assumed that the white noise obeys the Gaussian distribution (0, 0.022) and
the measurement error covariance matrix is constant.
Performance index: From Eqn (23) under ideal conditions, when there is
no data injection attack and transmission packet losses, the mean square error
matrix of system state estimation is Rεxk = (H
TWH)
−1
. In order to measure
the state estimation performance, Eqn (24) is used as the performance index.
Performance=
















When there only exist data injection attacks, while Eqn (17) is satisfied, three
different attacks are randomly selected, where one measurement is tampered in
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a88, five measurements are tampered in a41, and ten measurements tampered in







−‖zk‖2)/p], where p is the number of the tampered
devices. The details of the attack vector are shown in Table 1. The estimated
results are also illustrated in Figure 4.






Index 4 15 43 44 45
Value 0.84 -6.05 9.47 8.44 -8.57
a55
Index 11 12 16 25 29 47 48 50 51 54
Value -5.06 -1.18 -1.01 -3.22 -3.59 -0.1 0.17 -0.04 -2.17 -5.25
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14



















The mean of estimation
One device is attacked
Five devices are attacked
Ten devices are attacked
Fig. 4. State estimation under only data injection attack.
According to Figure 4, the data injection attack has a great impact on the
survivability of system state estimation. However, with the increase of attack
dimensions, the impact of the attack on the estimation decreases gradually if
the attack vector remains non-detectable by satisfying Eqn (16).
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The performance under attack
Fig. 5. Estimation performance under only data injection attack.
The performance index is also illustrated in Figure 5. This is a result from
the attack vector limited by Eqn (17). The more dimensions of the attack, the
lower the amplitude of each dimension in the attack vector will become.
In the packet loss only scenario, three packet loss rates are randomly selected,
which are 2%, 5% and 10% respectively. The specific information of random
packet losses is shown in Table 2, and the estimation results are illustrated in
Figure 6.





As show in Figures 6 and 7, a small amount of random data packet loss in the
data transmission of the sensor does not have significant impact on the system
state estimation. This is due to the existence of the measurement redundancy of
the power system, which guarantees the safety and reliability of power system
state estimation.
Furthermore, comparing Figure 4 with Figure 6, it is clear that the data
injection attack has a greater impact on the system state estimation. Again, the
performance indexes as shown in Figures 5 and 7 are not in the same order of
magnitude.
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The mean of estimation
2% packet loss  probability
5% packet loss  probability
10% packet loss  probability
Fig. 6. State estimation under random packet loss scenario.














The performance under packet loss
Fig. 7. Estimation performance in random packet loss only scenario.
When both packet losses and data injection attacks are presented, 5% packet
loss rate and 5 dimensions attacked are simulated.
Three scenarios, including random packet losses and data injection attack are
not coincidences, some coincident, and all occurred coincidently are analyzed.
The specific information of random packet loss and attack vectors are listed in
Table 3, and the estimation results are illustrated in Figure 8. It can be seen that
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Table 3. The details of the packet loss and attack vectors
Time Attack and packet loss Details Common index
44
a44
Index 9 15 24 30 49
No
Value -9.33 -7.28 -6.88 -3.79 -9.67
Packet loss index 7,20,22
92
a92
Index 2 14 30 44 46
30,44
Value 6.37 -6.40 0.94 9.84 -6.14
Packet loss index 21,30,44
53
a53
Index 12 24 28 48 53
12,48,53
Value -2.19 -8.03 5.65 8.68 -1.45
Packet loss index 12,48,53
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14



















The mean of estimation
Attack does not coincide with packet loss
The attack overlaps with packet loss
The attack is completely coincident with packet loss
Fig. 8. State estimation under both random packet loss and data injection attack.
notification of data injection attack and random packet loss will have a great
impact on system state estimation results.
As shown in Figure 9, when the random packet losses occur coincidently
with the attack, and the estimation performance is better than the non-overlap,
but the impact of the attack vector itself is greater.
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The performance under attack and packet loss
Fig. 9. Estimation performance under both random packet loss and data injection
attack.
5 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the impact of false data injection attacks on smart grid
state estimation under random packet losses. Firstly, the measurement model
of power grid under random packet losses is established, and an attack vector
range that can escape the detector is derived. Then, the weighted least squares
estimation is analyzed, and a non-detectable range of attack vectors in the data
injection attack is derived. It is proved that as long as the attack vectors are
selected in the derived range, the existing ”bad data” detection device will not
respond. Further, considering the false data injection attack, the mean square
error matrix of the weighted least squares estimation is provided. Finally, simu-
lation experiments on a IEEE-14 node system is used to compare the effects of
data injection attack, random packet loss, and simultaneous random packet loss
and data injection attack on the system state estimation.
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